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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

-

COMPULSORY

LINE

Up By POLICE

VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

Butler v. Crunlish (E.D. Pa. 1964)
Petitioners, held in custody for want of bail, sought to enjoin the
district attorney and police chief from ordering them to appear in a "line up"
for possible identification by victims of similar crimes. In granting the
injunction, the district court held that the compulsory "line up" deprived
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the fourteenth amendment. The court asserted that the constitutional authority
allowing the State to distinguish between criminal defendants by freeing
those who supply bail pending trial and confining those who do not,
furnishes no justification for any additional inequality of treatment beyond
that which is inherent in the confinement itself. An accused prisoner cannot be made an active participant in police investigations and subjected to
indignities to which his wealthier counterparts are not susceptible. Butler
v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
Recent demonstrations, decisions, and legislation in the field of
Negroes' civil rights have completely captured the public's interest and
attention to such an extent that an equally important revolution is about
to pass unnoticed. The idea of equality before the law for rich and poor
alike is one of the oldest and most fundamental aims of our legal system.'
Yet, until forty years ago, the disparity between the rich and the poor
charged with a criminal offense seemed insurmountable. The wealthy
accused, upon first threat of imprisonment, summoned an array of erudite
counsel. Release on bail was immediate; money was made available for the
intensive investigation necessary for adequate defense. If the defendant
were unsuccessful at the trial level, ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court

was always a possibility. The indigent accused, however, found himself in
an unhappy predicament. 2 Unable to afford bail, the indigent, although
presumed innocent in the eyes of the law, was thrust into jail and often

subjected to worse treatment than a convicted felon. 3 Inadequate counsel,
1. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940) ; SMITH, JUSTICE AND
TH4 POOR 3 (1919) ; THOmPSON, MArNA CARTA 365, 380 (1948).

2. Attorney James Donovan, in a lecture at Villanova University School of Law
(Fall, 1962), discussed the difficulty that these classes have in obtaining a fair trial
and adequate defense counsel.
3. Foote, Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. Rv. 685, 688
(1958) ; Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA.
L. Rv. 693, 723 and 724 (1958). The detention centers are maximum security penal
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if supplied at all, was the rule; furthermore, they were usually not appointed
until trial was imminent. 4 Coercion had occurred and the defendant's case
lost before the trial had begun. Counsel were inadequately paid, if at all,
and no money was made available for expert witnesses and necessary
investigation. Having a family to support, even the conscientious lawyer
had little time to devote to "charity cases." Statutorily imposed costs, insignificant to the wealthy, seriously burdened the poor. Finally, cries of injustice found receptive ears in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
Scarcely thirty years have past since the Supreme Court, through
the fourteenth amendment, 5 began to limit the authority of the states in
the area of criminal law. Two landmark cases, 6 both involving poor
ignorant Negroes who had been brutally beaten, 7 quickly brought to trial,"
and given little semblance of counsel, led to the holdings that coerced confessions are not admissible into evidence, 9 and that the right to appointed
counsel must include an opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. 10 The
indigent's right to counsel in state proceedings" was not finally declared
to be a fundamental right, 12 however, until the Gideon decision of the past
year.' 3 During the interim, the Supreme Court has declared that the
indigent defendant is entitled to a trial record free of charge when necessary
for appeal. 14 Lower federal courts have held that federal habeas corpus
may be available where the petitioner is barred from appealing his conviction by his inability to pay state imposed costs.' 5 Some courts have stated
that the right to counsel must be made available at the commencement of
institutions. Prisoners are often locked in their cells or in small quadrants for 18
hours out of the day. Restrictions caused by overcrowding and insufficient financing
handicap imprisoned accused far beyond the limits of what would be required solely to
achieve adequate security.
4. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932) (Counsel was not
appointed until the day of trial).
5. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332 (1934). The
Commonwealth ".

.

. is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with

its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."
6. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936) ; Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
7. The Brown opinion stated that the Negroes were brought to the scene of the
crime, surrounded by white men, accused, hanged twice and let down, and then beaten
until they confessed that they had committed the crimes. Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 281, 56 S.Ct. 461, 463 (1936).
8. In the Brown case, the time from arraignment to conviction was only two
days. Id. at 284, 56 S.Ct. at 464.
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
11. This right is explicitly guaranteed by the sixth amendment in federal proceedings. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942) ; Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938).
12. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1262 (1942). The test used
was whether the trial was offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness
and right.
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963).
14. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585 (1956).
15. United States ex rel. Embree v. Cummings, 233 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1956)
Robbins v. Green, 218 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Dolan v. Alvis, 186 F.2d 586 (6th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 906, 72 S.Ct. 298 (1952).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss4/6

2

Angino: Constitutional
Law - Compulsory Line Up by Police Violates Equal [V OL. 9
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the proceedings 16 and through appeal if meritorious. 17 Finally, the present
decision, following this same trend, holds that indigent defendants who
cannot afford bail cannot constitutionally be subjected to the humiliating
ordeal of the "line up."
Although proponents of states' rights in the field of criminal law and
advocates of stronger and more extensive police investigative power will
look upon this decision with disdain, it must be considered as a necessary
and logical step in the ideological progression of modern federal court
holdings. Compulsory "line ups," like coerced confessions, 18 unreasonable
searches and seizures,' 9 denials of right to counsel, 20 wiretapping, 2 1 and
so on, do produce more convictions; one cannot deny that fact. Whether
these convictions denote apprehension of the guilty, or possible denial of
justice and freedom to the poor, ignorant and unpopular; whether stronger
police protection will strengthen our democratic way of life or eliminate
entirely all that is personal and private; whether the rich are to continue
to be favored by the law or the poor man will get long awaited relief these are questions which have challenged the loftiest judicial minds of the
past generation. Their decisions have favored human freedom to the
possible judicial escape of a few guilty. They have come to the conclusion
that . . . "the law is no respecter of persons. It cannot look to the color
22

of a man's face, the size of his pocketbook, or the number of his friends.
All people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, "stand
23
on an equality before the bar of justice in every American Court.
To proceed from general historical facts to the case at bar, it is
undisputed that this decision will somewhat hamper present methods of
police investigation. The hindrance will be mild since the accused can still
be observed either in his cell or walking around the prison grounds. This
will approximate the view of a bailed defendant as he enters or leaves his
home or place of employment. Of course, the imprisoned indigent will no
longer be forced to submit to identification for every similar crime committed. He need no longer appear before glaring lights, speak and walk
about upon a raised platform, and undergo similar degrading treatment.
The constant dread of mistaken identification through sheer number of
callings will become a thing of the past.
Logically, this decision appears to be a good one since "... equal protection of the law means that equal protection ... shall be given to every
person under like circumstances ... and in the exemption from any greater
16. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44. If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the
court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at
every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able
to obtain counsel.
17. Holmes v. United States, 126 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1942) ; see also United States
v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
18. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281 (1957).
19. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
20. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963).
21. Fed. Comm. Act of 1934, § 605, 48 Stat. § 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
22. Jeffries v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 573, 574, 132 Pac. 823, 824 (1913).
23. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241, 60 S.Ct. 472, 479 (1940).
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burdens and charges than are equally imposed upon all others under like
circumstances. '24 Requiring an indigent defendant to submit to the degradation, self incrimination, and possible mistaken identity aspects of the
"line up," while excepting the similarly situated bailed accused, is an
invidious State discrimination against the poor. "In criminal trials a State
can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race, or color." '25 Simply because an indigent must submit to prison routine
and follow administrative orders does not mean that he forgoes all of his
constitutional rights. His right to liberty must necessarily be restrained
but his other rights remain. He is the prison officials' ward but not an
active participant in police investigations. "By the terms of the commitment, he is to remain in the county prison to answer the charge of murder,
not to answer the call of any and every person, official or other, who may
wish to meet him or speak to him.

....

-26

The Butler decision, noteworthy for its strict holding alone, attains
greater importance when coupled with recent federal judicial history. Its
greatest merit, however, will come from its influence upon future decisions.
The court's opinion indicates the trend that these cases will take. Because
the system of bail is weighted heavily against the poor, 27 because the

accused's release prior to the day of the trial is essential for adequate
preparation, 28 because our system of law is founded upon the idea that no
one should be punished prior to a trial and verdict by one's peers, and
because reasonable alternatives are often available, 20 possibly the next step
will be to hold that the prescription of any amount is excessive and violative
of the Constitution if the accused can not afford to pay it. The present
weight of authority is to the contrary, 30 but two recent Supreme Court
32
decisions 31 seem to indicate that these authorities will soon be overturned.
24. Ex parte Knapp, 73 Idaho 505, 508, 254 P.2d 411, 413 (1953).
25. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590 (1956).
26. Commonwealth v. Brines, 29 Pa. Dist. 1091 (1920).
27. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
28. Foote, Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 685, 691
(1958). The accused, because of the restrictions on his freedom, cannot use self help
to obtain evidence. He cannot maintain his job to help pay for the cost of investigation. Because of inadequate visiting rights, even the lawyer himself is restricted in
obtaining all necessary information.
29. Bandy v. United States, - U.S. -, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960) (long residence in
a locality, ties of friends and family, efficiency of the modern police, attempted escape
a crime in itself).
30. State v. Chivers, 198 La. 1098, 5 So.2d 363 (1941) ; State v. Alvarez, 182 La.
50, 161 So. 17 (1935) ; Heard v. Clark, 156 Miss. 355, 126 So. 43 (1930).
31. Bandy v. United States, - U.S. -, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960) ; Leigh v. United
States, - U.S. -, 82 S.Ct. 994 (1962).
32. In Bandy v. United States, - U.S. -, 81 S.Ct. 197, 198 (1960), the Court
stated that the theory of bail is based on the assumption that the defendant has property.
It then proceeded to attack the very root of this theory in light of equal protection:
To continue to demand a substantial bond which the defendant is unable to secure
raises considerable problems for the equal administration of the law. . . . Can
an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because he does
not happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom?
Two years later in Leigh v. United States, - U.S. -, 82 S.Ct. 994 (1962), the
Supreme Court went on to say that if it were affirmatively shown that upon release
appellant would be likely either to (a) harm the community or (b) fail to appear as
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In 1951, Christoffel v. United States,33 listed ability of the accused to give
bail as a major factor in the setting of bail. Federal Rule 46 also provides
that in proper cases the requirement of security may be dispensed with.
Yet, many state court justices are setting bail arbitrarily and in accordance
with fixed schedules which give little effect to the financial means of the
defendant. 34 This is an injustice that appears destined to be eliminated
in future federal court litigation.
Although not explicitly mentioned in the instant case, three other
major features of financial life prohibit the meting of equal justice by our
courts. Attempts have been made to alleviate these problems, and with
increased efforts they may be eliminated. They are discussed in the dissenting opinion in United States v. Johnson.35 The first is the imposition
of state costs which prevent the indigent from pursuing full legal redress.
Although the right of counsel may be clearly expressed in law, the
exercise of the right to counsel may be impaired substantially by the
imposition of costs and fees. In some jurisdictions, a defendant, with"
out resources to provide for his own defense, may have a completely
adequate defense, from preliminary hearing to final appeal, entirely
free from costs or fees. In others, court costs, the costs of transcripts, . . . and the like may operate 3 to
deprive him of the opportunity
0

which the law purports to give him.

The federal court decisions that have held that habeas corpus may be
available where the petitioner is barred from appealing his conviction by
inability to pay costs required by state laws, are steps in the proper direction.
The second hindrance is that in most state courts, no provision is
made whereby a poor man can get funds to pay for a pre-trial search
for evidence which may be vital to his defense and without which he may
be deprived of a fair trial. Perhaps it might be argued that the government's defraying of such expenses in regard to the indigent defendant
is essential to that assistance by counsel which the sixth amendment guarantees.37 Chicago, Illinois and Memphis, Tennessee as well as three California counties, provide that a public defender may employ investigators
who, free of charge, assist indigent defendants charged with crime to obtain
38
evidence in preparing their defenses.
Finally, the allocation of more funds for payment of appointed counsel
or the universal creation of a salaried public defender office equal to that
of the prosecution might be required by the sixth amendment. The indigent
defendant, with his recently graduated attorney or unwilling appointed
required, he would be ineligible for bail. Without such showing, however, he would
be eligible and indeed must be permitted to secure his release upon meeting reasonable
conditions. To impose a financial requirement beyond his means would be unreasonable.
33. 196 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
34. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW & ENFORCEMENT 640 (1951) ; SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINOLOGY 230-31 (1934) ; Comment, 106 U. PA. L. Rzv. 693, 706 (1958).
35. 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
36. Am. Bar Foundation, The Administration of Criminal Justice in the United
States 164 (1955).
37. United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
38. BLIss, DEFENSt DETECTIV4, 47 J. Crim. L., C.&P.S. 264 (1956).
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